TinyTwinGuard: a lightweight authentication scheme for digital twin edge networks using TinyJAMBU
Résumé
Digital Twin Edge Networks (DITEN) encounter significant challenges in balancing security and efficiency, as many existing authentication mechanisms either fail to deliver full security guarantees, such as perfect forward secrecy or protection against insider threats, or impose excessive overhead due to the use of ECC or RSA cryptographic primitives. To overcome these limitations, we introduce TinyTwinGuard (TTG), a lightweight authentication protocol designed specifically for DITEN environments and built upon the NIST-standardized TinyJAMBU Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) cipher. Using formal validation with the AVISPA framework and extensive experimental evaluation on Raspberry Pi 4B devices, we show that TTG satisfies a broad set of 13 security requirements relevant to DITEN, including user anonymity, resistance to privileged insider attacks, and perfect forward secrecy. Although TTG incurs slightly higher communication overhead than minimal hash-based approaches, with 4,896 bits compared to 2,560 bits, it achieves a 43.7% reduction in computational cost relative to ECC-based schemes and lowers energy consumption by 58.3%. Overall, these findings indicate that TTG achieves an effective balance between strong security and operational efficiency, making it well suited for industrial edge scenarios where both resilience and deployment practicality are essential.
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