EFFECT OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN THE POULTRY SECTOR ON HOUSEHOLDS' WELFARE IN TOGO: THE CASE OF DEMAND FOR LOCAL CHICKENS (GALLUS GALLUS)

Résumé

The objective of this study is to estimate the effect of public investment in the poultry sector on household welfare in Togo.The AIDS (Almost Ideal Demand System) model was used to estimate the consumption of local chickens in Togo and the Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) compensatory variation method was used to estimate the effect of public investment on household welfare using data from the DSID (Directorate of Agricultural Statistics, Informatics and documentation) SAN (Food and Nutritional Security) survey.The double least square method was used on a sample of 5636 rural and urban households to estimate the AIDS model.According to the results, following an increase in the average purchase price of a local chicken by 10% between 2015 and 2021, households lost on average 4636 FCFA of their income, i.e. a welfare loss of 6.5%.Low-income households (the poor) lost 3115 FCFA of their income, a 7.7% welfare loss.High-income households (the rich) lost 7677 FCFA of their income, a welfare loss of 6.4%. KEY WORDSWelfare, chickens, compensatory variation, investment, households.Welfare economics is an economic theory at the service of the evaluation of social situation and public decision making.Consequently, it is a foundation of public policy.Its study focuses on the means and criteria for judging and comparing the quality of social situations (Baujard, 2016).Historically, the notion of welfare economics has undergone a rich evolution in terms of approaches between economists.The utilitarian legacy weighs heavily on welfare economics, in which social welfare is then studied on the basis of the evaluation of individual utilities.The first welfare economics, whose foundations can be found in Marshall ( 1890); is well represented by Pigou (1920).This work aims to study the conditions of the market in terms of Paretian optimality.The «new welfare economics», represented by Bergson (1938) and Lange (1942), makes a clear separation between the study of the conditions of optimality of social situations and the study of the functioning of the market.These normative conditions are reduced to the Pareto criterion alone, to the exclusion of all redistributive issues; as they are deemed to be outside the scope of economics science, interpersonal comparisons of utility must be avoided.At the same time, a particular interpretation of utilities, based on choice, emerged.Arrow, 1951, sound the death knell of social choice by establishing the impossibility of constructing a social choice function on the basis of individual preferences without recourse to interpersonal comparisons.This led to a clear separation between two disciplines.On the one hand, normative economics, consisting of social choice and voting theory, equity and justice theories, was

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